< PreviousFigure 1: Frequency with Which Value Creation Strategies Are Recommended for the Value Proposition Figure 2: Average Implementation Time Needed to Have a Measurable Impact on Business As part of the coding process, I grouped the qualitative responses by similar themes, creating a narrative of value creation strategies related to value propositions. The advisors’ suggestions are shared below. Value Creation Strategies for Improving Value Propositions When working with business owners to pinpoint opportunities for value creation in their offerings, advisors frequently highlight the importance of enhancing the communication of the value proposition. For example, business owners might consider updating their websites to include client testimonials and case studies to help potential clients understand how a company’s products and services have assisted others with similar problems [BA03]. As one business advisor [BA25] explained, “We identify value propositions as they currently exist so that we can convey that to prospective buyers.” Some advisors ask clients to provide their view of the company’s value proposition, since business owners often know best the reasons customers prefer their products or services over other solutions [BA35]. Sometimes, management needs help figuring out what the company’s value proposition is and how to describe it. Once the value proposition is understood, an advisor can conduct an assessment to ensure that the company’s activities are focused on delivering it [BA18]. The advisor should also evaluate whether the value proposition, as it currently exists, can be transferred to a new owner [BA35]. Such a transfer can be challenging for small business owners, who are often the faces of their businesses and the main drivers of their value propositions. One business advisor [BA35] suggests surveying customers to gain their perspectives on the company’s value proposition. Gaining an understanding of the value proposition makes it possible to position “the business attributes to appeal to certain prospective buyers and drive a higher value” [BA12]. 25 20 15 10 5 0 Value Proposition Number of business advisor respondents RarelyNeverOccasionallyFrequentlySometimesUsuallyAlways 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Number of business advisor respondents 4–6 months 0–3 months 7–9 months 10–12 months 13–15 months Number of months to see impact 16–18 months 18+ months Value Proposition 20The Value Examiner ValuationA key aspect of the value proposition that business advisors highlighted was the importance of differentiators. It is critical for potential buyers to understand the company’s differentiators— not only what the company does differently but also why it does it that way—in order to accept the value proposition [BA04]. As one business advisor [BA13] explained, “I always ask the owner, ‘What makes you different/better? What is the secret sauce that will make a buyer want to own the business and continue with the success?’” Another advisor [BA10] asked the question, “Why would I do business with you versus anyone else?” This advisor further elaborated that the business owner better have three to five good reasons, and if the reasons are not top of mind, they should uncover them by talking with past customers or other business acquaintances. Developing an understanding of differentiators may require some digging by advisors assisting in the value creation process. An advisor [BA49] cautioned that “’really good service’ isn’t differentiation,” as they heard this same answer many times. But another advisor had a different take on service: “Competition is fierce in almost all industries, and I have found the top value proposition for successful businesses is customer service. Even if their pricing is not the lowest, often clients are willing to pay a bit more for truly exceptional service. I encourage all owners to put special focus on that and usually the rest follows” [BA06]. If service is truly a key differentiator, it is important to convey exactly how this exceptional service is being achieved. One advisor [BA23] emphasized the need to question business owners regarding specifics: “Each industry/ profession is somewhat different. I do not want to hear ‘good customer service.’ All companies think they deliver it. How do you do it and what is the experience at your company compared to your competitors? More automated? More services online? Less online and more phone availability?” Other advisors [BA19, BA21] emphasized that, to uncover a business’s “secret sauce,” it is important to communicate how a company is achieving success. They suggest documenting strategies [BA16] and using systems and processes. One advisor [BA43] explained: “In order to properly market and sell a business, I need to understand what makes this business better than their competitors. I will replay back to the owners what I learn during my conversations with them and look to validate what I sense. A red flag occurs when I struggle to see the differentiation and the owners are not really sure themselves. These businesses tend to be struggling.” Another advisor [BA44] noted, “Oftentimes [owners have] been doing what they [are] doing so long they forget this and usually this is when the owner has relationships with the top clients. Defining … what makes the company special is something that we have to engage with the sellers on [in] virtually every business transaction.” “Our confidential information memorandum (CIM) is created only after multiple in-depth conversations with the business owner. We listen and ask a lot of questions, with the outcome being to figure out what are the key value propositions. … The key is listening and then providing some key testimonials from some of the business owner’s existing and former customers” [BA37]. Several advisors suggested going through a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis with the business owner [BA26, BA50]. Capturing these perspectives allows the seller to frame a story that is consistent with what is being represented [BA26]. While much of the sale process focuses on the current business offerings of products and services and their associated value propositions, business owners and advisors must recognize that acquirers purchase companies based on their future prospects. For example, a potential acquirer may be interested in purchasing a business to integrate horizontally or vertically to gain synergies with the acquirer’s existing company. On the other hand, a financial buyer, such as a private equity firm, may be interested in expanding the business or reducing costs to put the company in a more favorable financial position over time. Individual buyers may see an opportunity to bring past experiences and relationships into an existing company as a way to propel growth. These acquirers want to see growth avenues but might view opportunities differently based on their situations and goals. Owners need to distinguish their businesses from other opportunities that might be out there for buyers, and demonstrate why their businesses have momentum behind them that can lead to further growth under a new owner’s leadership [BA47]. Expansion opportunities can excite potential buyers [BA39]. Says one advisor [BA48], Business owners and advisors must recognize that acquirers purchase companies on the basis of their future prospects. 21March | April 2025 A Professional Development Journal for the Consulting Disciplines“These suggestions center around … the key growth opportunities that the business has for a potential buyer, which may require additional sales or marketing efforts, additional strategic locations, or brand awareness (especially if the business lacks an online presence). Identifying and communicating opportunities requires business owners and their advisors to keep their fingers on the pulse of the industry. “Business owners also need to stay current with market developments so they can respond accordingly,” says one advisor [BA10]. This includes staying on top of competition and geographic market areas [BA02]. An advisor [BA30] recommends that owners reflect on these questions: • Are there competitors? • How easy would it be for a competitor to enter the market? • What are the competing products or services? • What are the alternatives to the business’s products or services? Industry and market research plays an important role, whether one is running a business into the future or preparing it for an eventual sale. Either path requires the company to be positioned to take advantage of opportunities that present themselves. “Many business owners [assume] that business value propositions need to be drastically different from their competitors in order to stand out. This isn’t always true. Market research is important to determine where possible gaps may exist among competitors. Differences can many times be tiny little things that have a huge impact. Once the competition realizes why you’re doing so much better than they are, it’s too late for them to catch up in any substantial way” [BA33]. Conclusion As reflected in the responses from study participants, seasoned intermediaries and exit planning advisors frequently suggest value creation suggestions associated with product and service offering value propositions. Companies have many opportunities to articulate what they are already providing with their offerings, enhance efforts to gain customers by targeting specific audiences, and frame these opportunities to increase their appeal to likely potential acquirers. Although this research does not uncover every tactic used to create value within the offering component of the business model, the suggestions provided act as a foundation and catalyst for generating additional ideas to increase potential acquirer interest and improve the outcome of an eventual business sale. Kipp A. Krukowski, PhD, ASA, CVA, is a clinical professor of entrepreneurship at Colorado State University. Dr. Krukowski earned his PhD from Oklahoma State University, his MBA from Carnegie Mellon University, and his BE in mechanical engineering from Youngstown State University. He earned the CEPA designation from the Exit Planning Institute and the CBI designation from the International Business Brokers Association. Prior to entering academia, Dr. Krukowski founded several business advisory firms and has served as an expert witness. He has been recognized by Business Brokerage Press as an industry expert on selling manufacturing companies. Email: kipp.krukowski@colostate.edu. Value Creation Ideas for Improving the Value Proposition Before a Business Sale • Reflect on offerings with management to identify what makes the company different/better than competitors • Survey customers to understand what drives them to return • Perform a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis • Identify “secret sauce” that would attract a potential acquirer, turning it into something tangible and sustainable that can be transferred • Enhance website and marketing with client testimonials and case studies • Position messaging to targeted buyer segments to drive higher value proposition through differentiation • Keep abreast of general market and industry changes and pivot accordingly • Understand potential alternative solutions from competitors and potential market entrants • Develop processes to deliver consistency • Prepare a list of growth opportunities for potential acquirers to pursue, but explain why those opportunities have not been pursued by current ownership 22The Value Examiner ValuationAccreditation Matters The only accredited credentials in the global business valuation and financial forensics profession. No other credentials have the privilege of dual accreditation. NACVA.com/Accredited NACVA1@NACVA.com (800) 677-2009 NCCA® (National Commission for Certifying Agencies®) | ICE™ (Institute for Credentialing Excellence™) | ANAB® (ANSI National Accreditation Board®)This column provides summaries of contemporary research in valuation and forensic accounting. Summarized articles and manuscripts—selected from numerous academic research outlets—cover significant developments that affect the ever- changing valuation and forensic accounting landscape. The objective is to increase awareness of research that advances knowledge of these subjects. Note: Some references cited in these reviews are not listed here, but are available in the articles or manuscripts being reviewed. As this column evolves, The Value Examiner encourages readers to forward relevant manuscripts or working papers for consideration. Please send links or files to lohreyp@sacredheart.edu or DanS1@NACVA.com with Academic Research Briefs in the subject line. Mini-Madoff? Anatomy of a Recent Ponzi Scheme Author: John Robert Sparger, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley Source: Journal of Forensic and Investigative Accounting 16, no. 3 (Special Issue 2024): 457–473 1 United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York, Case 23-60263-6-pgr, Document 358 (Filed 04/12/24). 2 Sparger, “Mini-Madoff? Anatomy of a Recent Ponzi Scheme,” 469. 3 Sparger explains that “gross loss” includes undistributed fictitious gains and reinvested dividends in Madoff and unpaid and reinvested interest due in Marshall. There were $19.5 billion of allowed claims in Madoff and recoveries of $18.6 billion (SIPC 2023; DOJPOA 2022). Summary Sparger analyzed information from the M. Burton Marshall Ponzi scheme and bankruptcy. 1 He applied forensic accounting methods to gauge the prospective losses for victims in this matter. By examining various classes of academic literature from criminal justice, practitioner, and legal disciplines, he: (1) Identif[ied] the warning signs and red flags indicative of a Ponzi scheme and precedents in bankruptcy cases applicable to the Marshall bankruptcy and (2) develop[ed] a comparison—Madoff—based on the warning signs and red flags and highlight[ed] potential outcomes of the Marshall scheme based on prior cases. 2 Sparger’s estimates of the potential damages suffered by Marshall’s victims and the probable consequences of the Marshall bankruptcy are subject to a couple of caveats. First, data limitations rendered the data imperfect, leading to potential inaccuracies. Second, precedents from prior bankruptcy cases related to Ponzi schemes may not be applied by the bankruptcy court or trustee. Despite these limitations, Sparger’s results indicate that: • There were significant similarities between the Marshall and Madoff schemes that transcend the absolute size, nature, and victims of the two schemes; and • Marshall’s victims will experience substantial losses. Madoff’s scheme generated $65 billion in gross losses ($0.9 billion net after recoveries) compared to Marshall’s estimated $90.5 million in gross losses ($35.7 million net). 3 Sparger observed that Madoff’s scheme was in a highly visible, regulated environment with financially sophisticated victims, while Marshall’s scheme occurred in a low visibility environment with mainly unsophisticated victims. Both schemes lasted much longer than the documented length of most other known schemes. Motivation for the Study Sparger points to the limited academic accounting literature on Ponzi schemes, compared to a substantial amount of criminal justice, legal, and practitioner literature on the subject. He also notes that the existing accounting literature reports the foundations of Ponzi schemes, historical methods, and legal By Peter L. Lohrey, PhD, CVA, CDBV Academic Research Briefs 24The Value Examiner Academic Reviewoutcomes of ruses related to bankruptcy cases. However, to the best of Sparger’s knowledge, his study is the first to: (1) analyze the financial implications of a contemporaneous Ponzi [scheme] and bankruptcy case using forensic accounting techniques to adjust bankruptcy data to estimate [victims’] potential loss[es] from a Ponzi scheme and (2) address the key components of Ponzi schemes by (a) comparing a contemporaneous Ponzi scheme and bankruptcy case (i.e., Marshall) to the Madoff scheme and bankruptcy as the basis for identifying potential actions and outcomes for the contemporaneous scheme and bankruptcy and (b) documenting the applicability of possible warning signs across two Ponzi schemes with differing (i) size, (ii) business natures, and (iii) victim populations. 4 Literature Review Sparger begins by providing background on Ponzi schemes, which are based on a type of fraud first committed by Charles Ponzi in the 1920s. He notes that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defines a Ponzi scheme as: An investment fraud that pays existing investors with funds collected from new investors. Ponzi scheme organizers often promise to invest your money and 4 Sparger, “Mini-Madoff? Anatomy of a Recent Ponzi Scheme,” 458. 5 “Ponzi Scheme,” Investor.gov, SEC, accessed February 24, 2025, https://www.investor.gov/protect-your-investments/fraud/types-fraud/ponzi-scheme. 6 Sparger notes that there is limited data available for the lives of Ponzi schemes. He points to a study by Deason, Waymire, and White (2021) that covered the period 1988–2012 and included 376 observations indicating that the average duration was 4.3 years and the median duration was 3.1 years. generate high returns, with little or no risk. But in many Ponzi schemes, the fraudsters do not invest the money. Instead, they use it to pay those who invested earlier and may keep some for themselves. With little or no legitimate earnings, Ponzi schemes require the constant flow of new money to survive. When it becomes hard to recruit new investors or when large numbers of existing investors cash out, these schemes tend to collapse. 5 In contrast to the SEC’s definition, decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeal have not produced a coherent legal description of a Ponzi scheme (Hague 2014). Hague explains, however, that these decisions have identified one common factor: “A Ponzi scheme requires proof that the returns paid to existing investors came from funds infused into the fraudulent scheme by later investors.” Lewis (2012) notes that, from a financial accounting perspective, Ponzi schemes are “technically insolvent from the first day of operation since earnings, if there are any, are less than the payments to investors, and liabilities to investors exceed the scheme’s assets.” Lewis goes on to state that, “Most schemes last longer than the numbers suggest because so many investors are continuing players, rolling over their short-term investments and adding to them.” 6 25March | April 2025 A Professional Development Journal for the Consulting DisciplinesSchoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007) found that trust varied by individual and across relationships. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) believed that trust is a function of the perceived ability, benevolence, and integrity of another party. They described trust as follows: The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party is based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party. 7 Carey and Webb (2017) found that trust and Ponzi schemes are linked to like-mindedness through relationships with and involvement in “identifiable groups, such as religious or ethnic communities, the elderly, or professional groups.” 8 Deason, Rajpol, Waymire, and White (2021); Stolowy, Messner, Jeanjean, and Baker (2014); and Zucker (1984) all found that affinity is a key component of characteristics-based trust and often plays a significant role in Ponzi schemes. Sparger continues his literature review by citing Greenspan (2009), who stated, “Gullibility is sometimes equated with trust” and is “explainable in terms of four factors: situation, cognition, personality, and emotion.” According to Greenspan: Situation relates to the circumstances of personal interactions and social feedback pressure, which may be based on affinity, whereas cognition relates to the application of rational thought related to the circumstances of personal interactions and emotion. Personality traits (e.g., being trusting, risk adverse or risk-taking, or impulsive) impact decision making, while emotion touches on the desire to achieve favorable outcomes and may correspond to greed. 9 Comparison of the Two Ponzi Schemes Sparger provides the reader with a description of Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, which ran for 12 years before Madoff pled guilty to “securities fraud, investment adviser fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, three counts of international and domestic money laundering, false statements, perjury, false filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and theft from an employee benefit plan” (Smith 2009). Madoff used his investment management firm to defraud investors of approximately $65 billion of principal and false investment gains. The author then cites Benson (2009), who identified 10 red flags found in the Madoff scheme, based on claims made in two separate civil complaints. (See Table 1). 7 Sparger, “Mini-Madoff? Anatomy of a Recent Ponzi Scheme,” 458. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 459. Table 1: 10 Red Flags Alleged in the Madoff Scheme 1 Returns were abnormally high (over 15 percent) with very little volatility and only five months of negative returns in 12 years. 2 Other funds were unable to generate returns “even remotely” comparable using the split-strike conversion strategy Madoff claimed to be using. The strategy used options to hedge the losses and lock in gains, but mathematical results showed that these options had a low correlation to the market from which they were generated. 3 Regulatory filings of the feeder funds showed small positions in equities, which the feeder funds explained was due to Madoff’s strategy of converting all of the assets to cash equivalents at the end of every quarter, but there was no record of the estimated $13 billion in assets being moved all at once. 4 Publicly available financial information concerning BMIS assets were inconsistent with the amounts Madoff purportedly managed. 5 Investors’ account statements could not be reconciled to the reported returns. 6 Lack of transparency into Madoff’s firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS), and conflicts of interest: Madoff acted as his own prime broker and custodian of all the assets he managed, whereas most hedge funds use large banks. Madoff refused to disclose his investment strategy. News reports in Barron’s and other sources raised concerns about the secrecy of Madoff’s operations and how he generated returns. 7 Madoff forbade fund managers from naming him as the actual manager in their performance summaries and marketing literature. 8 BMIS’s auditor, Friehling and Horowitz, was located in a small, 13-by-18’ office in Rockland Country, New York, and it had only three employees, one of whom was a secretary and one of whom lived in Florida. 9 BMIS generated revenue through transaction-based commissions, unlike most hedge funds, which charge management fees that generate higher revenues. 10 Turning over the investment funds, in some cases, allegedly violated the stated investment policy of diversity and created a substantial risk of reliance on Madoff as the single manager of a high concentration of the portfolio. Source: Table 2 in Sparger, “Mini-Madoff? Anatomy of a Recent Ponzi Scheme,” 461–62. 26The Value Examiner Academic ReviewWhen it comes to Marshall’s Ponzi scheme, Sparger notes that Marshall had offered “Eight Percent Promissory Notes” and, in addition, the “Eight Percent Fund,” which held combined, unsecured promissory notes paying 8 percent interest, which was payable in 30 days on demand. Marshall provided participants with two separate plans to choose from: 1. A savings account, or accumulation plan; and 2. A distribution plan, for participants who preferred to leave their principal balance intact while receiving interest payments. The scheme conveyed a false sense of professionalism to investors by providing documentation, periodic statements, and actual interest payments to stakeholders in the unsecured promissory notes. Sparger points out that although the sizes of the Madoff and Marshall Ponzi schemes were noticeably different, there were also similarities. For example, both schemes made payments to investors on a prompt basis (Fishman 2009; Moriarty 2023), until their victims demanded redemptions that neither could meet from existing assets. Present Status of the Marshall Ponzi Scheme According to Sparger, at the time of his article, the trustee in the Marshall bankruptcy cases had not provided an analysis of the Ponzi schemes that were used. The information available was restricted to the bankruptcy filing, monthly operating reports based on cash receipts and disbursements of the bankruptcy estate, and media reports pertaining to the Ponzi scheme and bankruptcy. Conclusion Although the Madoff and Marshall Ponzi schemes were significantly dissimilar in terms of magnitude, there were several parallels. Madoff was an expert at impressing an audience. He was also a methodological performer who projected a family environment inside his business while appearing to be competent. Marshall created a sense of trust by calling clients on their birthdays, thereby appearing to be someone the community could depend on. Table 2: Similarities Between the Madoff and Marshall Ponzi Schemes Risk FactorPossible Warning SignMadoffMarshall IncentiveIs the return guaranteed?NY Is there a promise or record of an above-market rate of return?YY OpportunityIs this a one-person show or tightly controlled company?YY Is there a growing pool of common investors who are overly excited investors?YY Is there a lack of separation or other conflicts of interest?YY Does the advisor falsify or avoid outside reliable audits?YY Is there a lack of transparency as to the advisor’s dealings?YY Does the advisor lack any required license or have any actions filed or bad publicity?NY AttitudeDoes the advisor claim a special or proprietary strategy?YN Does the advisor discourage detailed questions or make it difficult to track location of assets?YY Does the advisor live extravagantly?YNA Source: Table 5 in Sparger, “Mini-Madoff? Anatomy of a Recent Ponzi Scheme,” 468. Although the Madoff and Marshall Ponzi schemes were significantly dissimilar in terms of magnitude, there were several parallels. 27March | April 2025 A Professional Development Journal for the Consulting DisciplinesBoth fraudsters made payments to their investors on a prompt basis—until their respective financial crises occurred, when investors demanded redemptions that neither could meet based on the value of their existing assets. Madoff and Marshall’s schemes shared similar characteristics, including: • Guaranteed high rates of return compared to other investment prospects, • Growing pools of excited investors, • Potential conflicts of interest, • Inadequate audit oversight, • A lack of verifiable financial data, and • A lack of transparency pertaining to the investments made. Finally, the ultimate causes of their downfalls were, in Madoff’s case, an obscure public accounting firm that opined on Madoff’s financial statements without performing an actual audit of his operations. Marshall’s scheme collapsed because “he did not trust anyone to run his business in the event he fell ill and was unable to work” (Moriarty 2023d). In the end, the victims of these two Ponzi schemes were victims of their own gullibility, trusting the owners of the investment funds while simultaneously lacking sufficient knowledge about the basic principles of investing. Peter L. Lohrey, PhD, CVA, CDBV, specializes in business valuation for litigation, forensic, and financial reporting purposes. He provides lost profits and other measures of economic damages for commercial litigation purposes. He is also a visiting assistant professor of accounting at Sacred Heart University. Email: lohreyp@sacredheart.edu. For a flat annual fee of only $1,995, the Ultimate Training Pass will give you an uninhibited path to build and maintain a thriving practice because additional professional education costs will no longer be an issue. 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